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Abstract Cross border co-operation is increasingly viewed as an obvious and logical
consequence of an integrated perspective on river management. Consequently, we
would expect an increase of cross border co-operation and collaboration in EU
member states, through joint planning, co-management or co-implementation in
flooding policies, water quality management or river rehabilitation. If we take a
closer look at regional practices along member states’ borders however, co-operation
is often considered as problematic. To explain this discrepancy it is important to
look at the conditions of ‘successful’ co-operation in actual cross border initiatives.
We provide a framework to analyse regional initiatives, focusing on the extent of
co-operation and differences and similarities in policy arrangements. We apply this
framework to three cases at the Dutch–German border and conclude that the nature
of the problem structure and related interdependencies and ‘urgency’ (still) are
important. Moreover, we stress the importance of policy styles and especially the
problematic transition from policy formulation to policy implementation in water
management.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades contemporary water management is gradually, but inevitably
evolving from fragmented, differentiated types of policy towards practises of in-
tegrated water resources management and integrated river basin management
(Mostert 1998; Tucker Gilman et al. 2004; Watson 2004; Kuks 2004; Wiering and
Crabbé 2006; Jaspers 2003; Van der Keur et al. 2008).
The river basin (or the total water catchment area of a river or drainage basin)
is considered the basic unit for all planning and management actions. Although it
has variously been defined (Barrow 1998; Tucker Gilman et al. 2004; Jones et al.
2003), it is increasingly being used as the overarching concept to point at integrated
and interactive water policies. The concept of river basin management incorporates
at least three integrative ambitions concerning water systems and policy making.
Starting from the water system itself, ‘from inside to outside’, the first integrative
ambition is to connect and combine different aspects of water systems, such as water
quality and water quantity, groundwater and surface water, as well as relations in
the water chain (internal water system-integration). Next, it stresses the need for
external relationships between water management and other policy domains, such as
spatial planning, agriculture, housing, nature conservation and tourism (sometimes
referred to as external integration). Finally, it takes the river basin as starting
point for administrative co-operation and, as such, is crossing administrative and
geographical borders (aiming at cross border integration). In this line of reasoning,
transboundary and interregional co-operation is increasingly viewed as an obvious
and logical consequence of an integrated perspective on the management of the
major rivers of Europe (Mostert 1998; Jones et al. 2003; Kuks 2004). This trend
towards integration and co-operation between member states is empowered by
major European directives in the field: the Water Framework Directive (WFD,
Directive 2000/60/EC) and the European Flood Risk Directive (EFD, Directive
on the assessment and management of flood risks; 2007/60/EC).1 Especially the
WFD strongly affects both national and regional water policy practices. In the WFD
‘river basin’ means “the area of land from which all surface run-off flows through a
sequence of streams, rivers and, possibly, lakes into the sea at a single river mouth,
estuary or delta” (art 2, nr. 13). The Directive stresses international and cross border
co-operation and harmonisation through different procedural steps towards river
basin management plans (Kaika 2003; Meijerink and Wiering 2009). The European
Flood Risk Directive is prescribing and stimulating cross border co-operation in
warning systems and other elements of flood risk management.
1Although the fact we need two major directives for water management can also account for the lack
of integration between flooding policies on the one hand and issues of water quality and ecology on
the other.
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Consequently, an increase of cross border co-operation and collaboration between
EU member states could be expected, for instance through joint planning, co-
management or co-implementation in flooding policies, water quality management
as well as in river rehabilitation or restoration. Taking a closer look at regional policy
practices along member states’ borders, however, co-operation is often viewed as
problematic. So, while ‘Europe’ is striving for a borderless river basin management,
harsh realities reflected in regional practices do not always meet these demands.
This is why the conditions of ‘successful’ co-operation in actual cross border river
initiatives deserve more consideration. What exactly are the barriers and obstacles
that sometimes make transboundary co-operation so difficult to achieve? And what
are the incentives that encourage co-operation and collaboration?
These central questions lead us to focus on today’s experiences of regional cross
border river management. Next to this empirical focus, a theoretical framework is
suggested that deals with divergent perspectives that explain the development of
cross border co-operation. What are contemporary theories on cross border co-
operation telling us about conditions of ‘succesful’ co-operation? And, can these
elements be connected as part of a comprehensive framework to describe and explain
how regional transboundary river management evolves?
In the following sections we first give a short overview of literature on water
management in cross border settings (Section 2). This reveals explanatory variables
and conditions of successful co-operation on the basis of existing literature. We
link the principal explanatory variables to a specific perspective in policy analysis,
that of the policy arrangements approach (PAA) (Section 3) and elaborate the way
‘successes’ of cross border co-operation initiatives can be assessed. Section 4 contains
a short outline of the underlying empirical research. In the following sections the
framework is applied to three cases on the border of Germany and the Netherlands.
On the basis of our empirical findings we compare results of the cases in Section 8
and give our conclusions and reflections in the final section.
2 Explaining Cross Border Co-operation: An Overview
There are excellent overviews on the literature of cross border co-operation and
international river management available (Bernauer 2002; Marty 2001; Lindemann
2006; Mostert 1998). Conditions of success and failure of cross border co-operation
in water management have also been issued by many authors. Since it is impossible
to discuss all findings of the rich and wide-ranging literature here, this overview
is resticted to studies that in our view give complementary explanations for the
dynamics of co-operation, and which are suitable and informative for an analysis
in the European context, without pretending to be exhaustive (with special focus on
Le Marquand 1977; Saetevik 1988; Dupont 1993; Meijerink 1998; Dieperink 1999,
2000; Linnerooth 1990; List 1990; Bressers and Kuks 2004; Marty 2001; Skjaerseth
2000; Haas 1990; Blatter 2001; Lindemann 2006).
Most scholars of cross border co-operation acknowledge that the general re-
sponse of policy actors is at least in part dependent on the basic features of the
problem or the problem structure. The principle is that co-operation is generally
less likely in upstream–downstream situations than in situations “characterized by
more symmetrically distributed environmental damages, most notably in the case of
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common pool resources (...)” (Bernauer 2002: 6). Upstream–down stream conditions
often correspond to so-called dead lock games. To overcome these dead lock
situations, the literature reveals three dominant approaches. The first major branche
of literature is based on an analysis of negotiation processes in which key concepts are
(policy-) actors, interests and resources. To overcome asymmetries in the problem
structure policy actors will try to achieve their objectives by trade off’s and/or making
resources available for (upstream) partners, e.g. by financial means. A second group
of authors shares a ’regime perspective’ to analyze co-operation. The concept of
‘regime’ refers to the principles, norms, rules and procedures that implicitly or
explicitly guide interactions between policy actors. A regime-approach points at the
establishment of a set of cross border institutions that contribute to the solution of
the water management problems. And recently the rise of a third approach in the
literature on cross border co-operation in water politics can be witnessed. In this
relatively new approach the focus shifts from the more organizational (policy actors,
resources and institutional rules) dimension of policy making to its content; the
ideas, the policy concepts in use, the belief systems or problem definitions of actors.
These, what we call, cognitive and discursive approaches, stress that the extent of
co-operation, as well as the direction in which it evolves, is strongly influenced by the
frames and concepts that actors use to give meaning to the problems with which they
are confronted. Below these three dominant approaches will be given some more
detail.
2.1 Negotiation Processes, Actors and Interests
Authors that focus on negotiation processes generally define successful co-operation
as a result of the distribution and redistribution of interests and resources on either
side of the border (e.g. Le Marquand 1977; Saetevik 1988; Dieperink 1999, 2000). To
establish co-operation “for each party the net satisfaction desired from international
agreement must be greater than that associated with the national option” (e.g.
Le Marquand 1977, p. 19). Co-operation is dependent on the complementarity of
resources, possible exchanges and trade offs within the relevant policy domain. When
trade offs within the domain are not possible or feasible, a solution might be found in
the linkage of the relevant issue with issues outside the domain. So, for example, in
the Scheldt river basin water quality and estuarine rehabilitation downstream were
first linked to the issue of maritime acces to the port of Antwerp, an important
interest of Belgium. In a later stage these issues were further linked to the Meuse
river basin (at considerable geographically distance) and to discussions between The
Netherlands and Belgium (Flanders) on the High Speed Train linkage (Linnerooth
1990; Meijerink 1998). Another condition that could help to overcome an adverse
distribution of (water-related) interests and resources is the existence of a dominant
actor (nation state), although many authors have doubts about the effectiveness (see
Haas 1990 on the dominance of France; List 1990 on the USSR, and Lindemann 2006
on Germany as a dominant player in negotiations).
The analysis of negotiations also provides insight into other, additional factors that
stimulate successful negotiation and co-operation: is sufficient knowledge available?
What about the quality of the delegations and of the supportive secretariat? And are
particular actors involved, most notably politicians?
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2.2 Regime Approach
The nature of asymmetries and interdependencies, and the related distribution of
interests and resources is generally recognized as highly relevant, but they do not
always explain the establishment of successful cross border co-operation. The regime
approach shifts the focus to the nature of the institutions that are created to foster
and entrench co-operation. Young (1999) defined regimes nicely and openly as
“recognised patterns of practice around which expectations converge”. Regimes
have both a substantial dimension, seen as rights, norms and rules, and a more
procedural dimension, that of recognized arrangements for social and collective
choices. Different authors were inspired by this approach that fits international
arrangements and agreements (more in Young 1999; Kahler et al. 1995; Keohane
and Nye 1989; Marty 2001; Ma et al. 2008). Summing up some of the findings of
regime theory (Marty 2001; Skjaerseth 2000): cross border co-operation is more
easily established when procedures for decision making encourage clarity about the
objectives of the actors involved, when they are flexible enough to cope with chang-
ing circumstances, and when they are based on majority voting. The implementation
of joint regulation, in later stages of the policy process, will be more successful
when these commitments are binding, clear, transparent and feasible. According
to Skjaerseth (2000) international regimes mostly should produce common norms
and values; they can and should encourage the aggregation and integration of the
interests of the countries or riparian states involved. Both Marty and Skjaerseth
stress however, that institutions (as regimes) can not be implanted; they evolve slowly
and are historically contingent.
2.3 The Importance of Discourse
A third approach focuses more on discursive and cognitive processes. Authors with
this perspective want to discover which beliefs are held by the policy making actors,
where shared beliefs become important and how they stimulate or hamper joint
policy making (e.g. Haas 1990; Blatter 2001; Meijerink 2008). Haas (1990) looked
at co-operation regarding environmental pollution of the Mediterranean Sea and
the formation of the so-called MedPlan. Haas first considered the more traditional
explanatory frameworks of neo-realism and historical materialism. He concluded
that the distribution of power among countries or the influence of the more dominant
country in the region (France) could not explain the developments in co-operation.
The rise of a transnational alliance of scientists offered a better explanation. This
so-called transnational epistemic community shared common knowledge about envi-
ronmental pollution, but also common beliefs and objectives that were institution-
alized in new governmental and intergovernmental institutions and ‘penetratred’
policy making in this way. Blatter (2001) observed that in the case of regulating
the pollution caused by motor boats on the transboundary Lake Constance, cross
border co-operation evolved around an issue where co-operation was not obviously
following from interdependencies or the distribution of interests and objectives of the
co-operating countries, and where the relevant damage could readily be assigned to a
specific jurisdiction. Instead, Blatter focuses on discursive elements of co-operation.
In line with Haas, the problem of lake Constance was put forward by a coalition
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of environmental protectionists and the case of pollution of motor (pleasure) boats
offered the existing political cross border institutions a platform of high symbolic
value which could be used to emphasise the importance of their own existence (see
Verwijmeren and Wiering 2007, p. 32). Secondly, Blatter relates the extent of cross
border co-operation to the trends in integrational discourses in Europe, that vary
with the momentum of signing specific important Treaties or other focusing events.
Thus, he shows the importance of investigating not only interests, resources and
rules, but also general discourses, both material or substantial discourses connected
to the issue involved as well as to the co-operation itself.
In short, this perspective puts forward that co-operation is more easily established
when the problem at hand is framed as a joint problem, when the problem and/or its
solution are perceived in similar terms by all actors, when an epistemic community
of professionals and a general overall discourse (e.g. ‘ecology’) exists that either
encourages solving the problem at hand or encourages cross border co-operation
in general.
2.4 The Role of the Macro-context
All explanatory or ‘independent’ variables discussed so far mainly focus on the
nature of the problems, the circumstances and features of initiatives and institutions
at the cross border level itself. Some authors however, take the macro-context of
cross border co-operation into account and stress the influence of national policy
making and politics. List (1990), for example, explains how the West German
Ostpolitik (politics towards eastern Europe) paved the way for co-operation in
the Baltic Sea. Two authors have actually elaborated this type of analysis. Marty
(2001) analyses the effects of national negotiations, concluding that the absence
of involvement of national authorities may seriously hamper the establishment of
co-operation at a regional level. Skjaerseth (2000) analyses the effects of national
institutions, explaining that a high level of integration within national governments
as well as a national preference for command and control policy tools will positively
influence the actual implementation of cross border regulation.
On the issue of integration of countries, Bernauer (2002) refers to the work of
Rainer Durth: “(...) problems are easier to solve if riparian countries are more inte-
grated, i.e. when the density of political, economic and societal ties among countries
is greater.” Bernauer summarises the arguments of Durth; with more integration,
compensation of upstream countries is easier, countries will make more credible
commitments to one another, information is more complete (and transparent),
notions of equity or justice are likely to be congruent, transboundary institutions
(that are more likely to develop too) can mitigate unequal bargaining leverage
and finally, opportunities for non-governmental players to influence outcomes are
greater (Bernauer 2002: 7; see also Durth 1996).
Dupont (1993) also points at cultural differences or similarities. Dupont inves-
tigated co-operation of the river basin states of the Rhine and the International
Commission of Protection of the Rhine in a specific period of time. He found that
countries increasingly came to regard water pollution as a shared problem that was
their joint responsibility. As a result they were able to reach an agreement despite the
great differences in socioeconomic interests. Dupont concludes that the (relatively)
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homogeneous cultural background of the countries in the Rhine river basin helped
negotiators conduct negotiations in a more constructive way.
2.5 An Integrated Approach
The overview above confirms that a great deal of knowledge already exists about
the determinants of succesful cross-border co-operation; one may even wonder why
additional research was necessary. Each of these approaches has its own pros and
cons. However, to get a thorough understanding of cross-border co-operation it is
useful to combine these different approaches and perspectives towards a more inte-
grated and comprehensive approach, which gives room for the different dimensions
mentioned: actors, resources, institutional rules, and discourse. And these aspects
can be assessed on both a micro level (regional arrangements) and macro level
(national arrangements). Below we wil discuss such an approach: the so called Policy
Arrangements Approach.
3 Elaborating the Analytical Framework
Why do some regions or countries go further down the road of transboundary co-
operation and others have a hard time achieving any results? First, we return to
a basic explanation, in that it depends on features of the problem itself (problem
structure) and the related basic distribution of interests (see Section 2). For river
basin management in general holds that the upstream and downstream-geography
often influences the distribution of interests and resources of countries in the river
basin. Downstream countries will be more interested in co-operation in water quality
or flooding issues, and upstream countries when navigation issues are at stake (e.g.
when a downstream harbor or issues of access to water resources are involved; see
Meijerink 1998).
Besides this rather straightforward explanatory framework, the differences and
similarities of the institutions on either side of the border are of major importance.
It goes without saying that co-operation is more easily established when differences
between countries are small; this can be further specified by looking at the differences
and similarities of (sectoral) policy arrangements, in other words, the congruence of
institutions in policy domains on both sides of the border. Therefore, we make use of
the so called Policy Arrangements Approach (PAA), that has been applied in several
studies related to the environmental policy domain and water management (e.g. Van
Tatenhove et al. 2000; Arts and Leroy 2006; Wiering and Arts 2006; Crabbe 2008).
A policy arrangement is an analytical concept to describe and analyze the processes
and outcomes of institutionalization in a specific policy domain. The approach pays
attention to both institutional (as ‘organisational’) and discursive aspects of policy-
making. A policy arrangement is initially described as “the temporary stabilization
of the substance and organisation of a policy domain” and points at stability and
change in policy processes (Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). It builds on four dimensions
of policy: the actors involved (and their coalitions and interactions), the resources
of actors, the rules of the game in the playing field of the policy domain and the
relevant policy discourses. This approach is useful to include- and combine-varying
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explanatory variables found in literature. The policies along the different dimensions
of a policy domain can be described; the role of policy actors and coalitions;
the role of interest and (exchange of) resources; the role of formal and informal
rules of the (co-operation) game; and finally the sector-based policy discourses as
reflected by subject-related policy concepts, cultural traditions, storylines in policy
argumentations, etc. With a description of policy arrangements identification of the
main differences and similarities between the relevant water policies in the specific
cross border region is possible, and, in addition, the enabling and constraining
characteristics of the national arrangements (for more details see Verwijmeren
and Wiering 2007). Finally, besides problem features and congruence of regional
arrangements, a third explanatory variable is added to the conceptual model: the
stand towards cross border co-operation of the national institutions or policies, which
is of major importance for the policy discretion of regional arrangements.
The main purpose of this article is to explain the degree of actual co-operation
in river management in cross border settings. To do this it is helpful to be as clear
as possible about what is meant by the degree or extent of co-operation. Therefore
three criteria will be used: co-operation formation, co-operation effectiveness and
stakeholder satisfaction. Co-operation formation refers to the institutionalization of
any co-operation initiative. It resembles the concept of regime formation (see e.g.
Linnerooth 1990; List 1990). In general, it points to processes of structuring the ‘ways
of doing’ or ‘ways of thinking’ across borders towards co-operative patterns. In actual
practices, this can vary from opening up communication channels, discussing joint
problem definitions to creating joint legislation or even organizations. The level of
co-operation formation can be determined by looking at ‘output’: the amount and
frequency of interactions, the scope and amount of joint research reports, policy
documents, agreements, treaties, etc. Co-operation effectiveness is a thougher one.
It is difficult to establish the exact causal links between cooperative activities and
problem solving capacities in water management (but one generally presumes it
helps). As an alternative to measuring causality in problem solving, one can look
at the degree of implementation of specific ideas, plans, measures etc. in the policy
practices, in other words the degree of adoption of institutions (e.g. policy concepts,
-plans, -organizations) or institutional innovations.
The third criterion of ‘successful’ cross border co-operation is that of stakeholder
satisfaction; it refers to the opinions of the actors involved about the degree of
success of co-operation. This can, of course, only be an additional factor, but it is
not unimportant because the ideas of involved parties on both side of the border
can be taken into account, and third party-actors, such as NGO’s or business, can be
asked to reflect on the joint activities of governmental institutions.
4 Outline of the Empirical Research
The research project where our findings in this section stem from, took place
within the framework of the so-called ‘Rivercross’-project, which was funded by
the Interreg IIIc programme Change on Borders. The project gave an opportunity
to compare cross-border co-operation in different parts of Europe and, in the case
of the Dutch–German border area, in different problem situations in the same
border area.
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4.1 Methodology
At the start of the project a framework of analysis was set up. It consisted of three
major parts: (1) giving a description of (the extent of) cross-border co-operation
as the ‘variable’ to be explained, (2) giving a description of the regional policy
arrangements involved to explain possible relevant differences and similarities, and
(3) combine the two and give a rich explanation of the backgrounds of successful
cross-border co-operation. Although some detailing and operationalisation turned
out to be necessary during the project, this part of the analysis was implemented as
devised.
There were different rounds of analysis in the project: a first round contained a
structured questionnaire for the co-operating experts to apprehend the cross-border
co-operation in each region and to select a limited number of projects for the case
studies. During the following rounds each researcher described the selected projects
with increasing levels of detail (in position and a framework papers, a situation
report, and finally a chapter in an edited volume that contained the case studies and
the project conclusions; Verwijmeren and Wiering 2007). Data collection consisted
of desk study of literature and policy documents as well as interviews with five–seven
stakeholders for every case study. Additionally, workshops were organised in which
conclusions were discussed with stakeholders and experts alike.
The framework (Fig. 1) was applied to in total five cases of cross border co-
operation in Europe. For the purpose of this article three cases on the Dutch–
German border, dealing with three different issues in water management, are
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Fig. 1 A policy arrangement approach to cross border settings
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elaborated. The first case concerns river restoration. Dutch and German actors have
been working together on the subject of river restoration for many years already in
the sub-catchment of river Dinkel. The second case refers to water quality issues
at the river Vechte/Vecht. The case describes and explains the Dutch–German co-
operation while implementing the EU-Water Framework Directive. The third case
addresses flood risk management policies along the river Rhine, especially the so-
called Dutch–German Working Group on High Water.
The national background in general, e.g. national cultural features or political
frameworks are similar (they all deal with Dutch and German policies) and they
all have to some extent an upstream–downstream problem structure. But cases are
different regarding the specific issue-related policy context and the arrangements
that institutionalized around the topics addressed. Therefore, the focus shifted
towards regional policies and arrangements.
Apart from the three cases mentioned above the research project also examined
co-operation in flood protection along the Bug river in the Polish–Ukrainian–
Belarussian border area and in the Evros Delta in the Greek–Bulgarian–Turkish
border area. These cases are not discussed here because of the large contextual
difference with the Dutch–German border area, e.g. as regards the degree of integra-
tion of countries. The interested reader will find more information in Verwijmeren
and Wiering (2007) to see how was dealt with the other cases.
5 The Dinkel Planning
This section addresses cross border co-operation in the context of river restoration
and is related partly to the EU WFD. In contrast to the case in the next section, how-
ever, German–Dutch co-operation in river restoration issues is not solely affected by
the WFD and dates back well before the WFD was launched in 2000.
5.1 Problem Structure
River regulation, floodplain cultivation, and hydrological barriers, such as weirs and
dams, have generated uniform rivers in Germany and the Netherlands, which no
longer provide the capacity to fulfill their inherent functions (see Feld and Locker-
Grutjen 2007 for more detail). Consequently, hydro-morphological degradation of
rivers and floodplains is considered a major problem in both countries. To overcome
this problem, the German Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) estab-
lished a Floodplain Protection Programme NRW to improve and sustain the natural
development and dynamics of rivers and their floodplains. The programme provided
the framework for other activities, such as the Floodplain Protection Concept
River Ems (Darschnik et al. 1992; Staatliches Umweltamt Münster 1999, 2006),
the Floodplain Concepts for the river Niers and the river Berkel (Bezirksregierung
Münster 1999). Independently, and primarily driven by the major policy discourse of
‘Room for the river’ or ‘Space for Water’ in Dutch water policy (Van Stokkom et al.
2005; Wiering and Arts 2006) similar concepts have been set up in the Netherlands
(e.g., ‘The Dinkel and the Dinkel Valley’, http://www.wrd.nl; ‘Integrated Restoration
of the Berkel’, http://www.berkelproject.nl).
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Fig. 2 Map river Dinkel
5.2 Co-operation
Although the cross border river Berkel was subject of restoration planning in both
countries, the German ‘Berkel Floodplain Concept’ and the Dutch ‘Integrated
Restoration of the Berkel’ were isolated initiatives at the same river. An example
of more far-reaching coordination in the field of river restoration is the ‘cross border
Dinkel Planning’ (Bezirksregierung Münster and Waterschap Regge en Dinkel 2003).
The planning (hereafter referred to as Dinkel Planning) was jointly developed by
German and Dutch project partners and partly funded within the INTERREG II
program. The Dinkel is a major tributary to the Vecht(e) and is 93 km long. It drains
an overall catchment of 650 km2 (Bezirksregierung Münster and Waterschap Regge
en Dinkel 2003). The entire river course has been hydro-morphologically degraded,
natural dynamics are largely lacking due to water regulation and flood protection
measures, while the water quality is impacted by nutrient and pesticides due to
intensive agricultural land use in the catchment (Fig. 2).
From 1997–2001, the partners jointly made an inventory of the morphological
status of the entire river course and its adjacent floodplains. The inventory aimed at
facilitating future floodplain restoration and conservation planning, and ultimately at
improving the overall river ecosystem quality and dynamics. Remarkably, the fairly
progressive cross border collaboration has already been in line with the aims and
scope of the WFD long before 2000.
5.3 Co-operation Effectiveness
A project steering group member responded in an interview that the Dinkel Planning
itself can be seen as a success: “The planning provided—for the first time—a cross
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border co-operation aiming at the restoration of an entire river and its floodplain”.
Although other respondents generally agreed with this statement, stakeholder re-
sponses start to differ, when it comes to the implementation of the planning: the
implementation is still hampered by manifold obstacles. The question of land use
changes, private property rights to floodplains or areas on the floodplain, and
possible adverse economic effects of restoration measures are still open. Integrated
river restoration, i.e. restoration that extends from the river into the floodplain, will
be impossible if the land owners (primarily farmers) refuse to sell or make their
land on the floodplain available for restoration schemes. “Basically, the situation
is demoralizing, as there is no way to implement the Dinkel Planning. We will have
to get every single part of it through an exhaustive official planning and approval
process, which is simply impossible”, a respondent stated, visibly annoyed by the
situation. Thus, stakeholder satisfaction gives a mixed picture when regarding both
policy formulation and implementation.
Within the four-year project, the Dinkel planning yielded three unpublished
reports (one cross border report and two national ones), a summary and a bilin-
gual brochure (Bezirksregierung Münster and Waterschap Regge en Dinkel 2003).
Compared to the output of other cross border initiatives, the number of documents
produced is large. Yet, the Dinkel Planning clearly shows that effectiveness cannot
be solely and reliably assessed on the basis of document output.
5.4 The Policy Arrangements Framework
5.4.1 Actors and Coalitions
In both countries river restoration is mainly a regional policy field, within which
two administrative pairs play the major role: the Dutch Provinces vs. District
Governments in North Rhine-Westphalia and Dutch Water Boards vs. Regional
Environmental Agencies in North Rhine-Westphalia. National/federal authorities
are important actors too, as they provide legal or semi-legal frameworks for regional
authorities, while local authorities become important during the implementation of
specific restoration measures. From a policy actors’ point of view, the cross border
Dinkel Planning at first sight represents a good example of cross border co-operation
in river restoration. The cross border consortium included regional representatives
of the German–Dutch Border Waters Commission, Dutch Provinces and Water
Boards, German District Governments and Regional Environmental Agencies, and
two planning enterprises (see Feld and Locker-Grutjen 2007, p. 54, for details). In
particular, the Dutch and German administrative pairs (see above) seem to ‘fit’
and work well together on the regional scale, although some political structures are
different in both countries—there’s, for instance, no counterpart for German Federal
States in the Netherlands.
5.4.2 Resources
The amount of resources in the Dinkel Planning is considerable, as both money
(project budget) and expertise were available with the actors involved. Besides co-
financing, the responsible authorities ‘solely’ had to co-ordinate the progress of the
project, which was done extensively during numerous informal and formal meetings
and oral and e-mail contacts.
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5.4.3 Rules of the Game
The Dinkel Planning did develop specific informal rules of the game. During the
interviews with actors, two respondents stressed the rather informal character of
the initiative. One respondent stated that he had fortnightly contacts during the
planning phase (1998–2001). The coordination of project planners and coordinators
was clearly structured, while the regional authorities (Bezirksregierung, province)
provided the legal power to take decisions. Accordingly, the planning provided
prerequisites for an efficient and successful policy initiative. It should be born in
mind, though, that the Dinkel Planning did not aim at implementation, but solely at
the planning of restoration schemes on the Dinkel floodplain. Thus, co-operation
was possible on a more abstract level without being overly limited by existing
spatial planning laws. Any implementation of the planning—even if intended very
locally—would require much more effort and would bring many more rules into
the game, one of which was the German approval of plans (Planfeststellung). This
planning approval involves all stakeholders affected by the planning and often
hinders and delays implementation. So ‘real’ success of the Dinkel Planning, i.e. the
implementation of restoration schemes on the Dinkel floodplain, is hardly visible at
present.
5.4.4 Discourses
There was no discourse that was specific for the Dinkel Planning. Rather, the plan-
ning fits almost perfectly into the general ‘room for the river(s)’ water policy concept.
This is one of the major discourses at present in Germany and the Netherlands. In
North Rhine-Westphalia, floodplain restoration has been an integral part of river
restoration for more than 15 years. The major objective of this programme is to
restore a natural river landscape, with its functions. In the Netherlands, ‘room for
the rivers’, although also linked to the floodplains, predominantly means ‘retention
room for floods’. Being extensively threatened by flooding and thus increasingly
sensitive to flooding problems, the Netherlands aims at creating flood retention
capacities within a whole river basin. The rationale of the Dinkel Planning involves
both motivations, and thus possible dissimilarities in discourses seem not to be major
obstacles for co-ooperation.
Wrapping up, in principle there were no obstacles created by important differ-
ences in the nature of the policy arrangements on both sides of the border, looking
at actors’ constellation, resources available and joint discourses. The fundamental
problem for the assessment of cross border co-operation though is that planning
and implementation are two completely different processes. The Dinkel Planning
initially did not aim at the implementation of restoration schemes. Instead, the aim
was to compile the current status and conditions on the Dinkel floodplain, namely
land uses, and to identify key areas for future restoration measures. The purpose
was to create a shared vision on the Dinkel, setting down the Leitbild (reference
or natural condition) for the Dinkel floodplains as a valuable and important step
towards the restoration of the river and its floodplains. Hence, feasibility did not
play an important role in the Dinkel Planning.
When the initiative is assessed in the light of implementation purposes and
adoption of policy ideas (part of co-operation effectiveness), the same features
can be interpreted as drawbacks, as is the lack of involvement of farmers in the
M. Wiering et al.
planning. The need for river restoration is still obvious, especially considering the
ecological ambitions of the Water Framework Directive, as is the need for a new
discussion of future agri-environmental schemes. However, the Dinkel planning
can only become reality as soon as major stakeholders and the general public
accept the need for extensive river restoration and support large-scale (cross-border)
restoration schemes.
To conclude this first case, river restoration is not a policy field that suffers from
a strong urgency to create cross border policies. Traditionally, river restoration is
predominantly a regional or even local endeavor. The low level of interdependence
on the subject of river restoration does not urge politicians or the public to get
involved. The Dinkel Planning was one of the most ambitious projects in creating
joint planning but remained mostly a research project.
6 The River Vecht and the Water Framework Directive
In this section cross border co-operation is assessed in view of the implementation of
the European Water Framework Directive (WFD) in Germany and the Netherlands.
6.1 Problem Structure
The WFD requires improvements in water quality with the objective of a good
ecological and chemical status of all water bodies in Europe, to be reached in 2015
(first deadline). The Directive prescribes several procedures, work packages to be
undertaken and products to be delivered. Major subsequent work packages concern
the ecological characterization of the river basin, the development of a surface
water quality monitoring system, the preparation of a program for improvement
and finally the development of a river basin management plan. This analysis covers
the characterization report and the monitoring system. If the (sub-) river basin
crosses national borders, cross-border coordination is asked for. Our case is the
river Vecht, that originates in the German federal state North Rhine Westphalia
(NRW), streams through Lower Saxony and then enters into the Netherlands (cf.
Lulofs and Coenen 2007). It is part of the WFD-district of Rhine-East, that is marked
as a transboundary river basin district. Especially where water quality issues are
concerned there are typically ‘upstream–downstream’-interdependencies between
Germany and the Netherlands (Fig. 3).
6.2 Co-operation
The preparation of the river basin characterization report in the two federal German
states (North Rhine Westphalia and Lower Saxony) and for Dutch territory was out
of phase and the approach and concepts varied substantially. The involved water
managers acted relative autonomously and coordination was thus far from effective.
This resulted in three reports that were dissimilar and heterogeneous and hard to
integrate into the required format. When time was running out, the sub-reports were
integrated pragmatically by a consultant. Afterwards many corrections were needed.
Some blame the differences in the ‘learning curve’ of actors across borders and others
think that national regimes and problem perceptions were more dominant.
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Fig. 3 Map river Vecht
Subsequently the WFD asked for a monitoring system that included chemical
and biotic indicators. A working group of Dutch and German water managers
addressed this issue for the relevant area. A Dutch and two dissimilar German
federal guidelines for monitoring already pre-existed and had to be harmonised
somehow. The working group discussed the differences and possibilities for cross-
border calibration. To create completely identical systems proved impracticable due
to the impact of German federal requirements. But calibrating the systems was
possible and now German and Dutch data can be converted. This enables upstream
water managers interpret downstream data in their own system and reversed.
6.3 Extent of Co-operation
The criteria as introduced in Section 3 are now adressed. With regard to stake-holder
satisfaction the interviewees expressed themselves in positive terms. The Dutch were
pleasantly surprised by the cooperative attitude of the German upstream actors.
German actors just acted ‘corresponding to their policy style’ that includes precise
handling of hierarchical and legislative requirements. This implied that the EU
initiated legally imposed WFD tasks were executed precise, but this accounts also
for less immediate or pressing elements such as the coordination with the Dutch.
In terms of co-operation output success has to be judged as easily observable
however sub-optimal. The obligatory output was realized, however the emerged
coordination flaws with regard to content and quality should be kept in mind.
Facilitating cross-border convertible monitoring data is a step towards more clarity
for upstream–downstream coordination of surface water quality policy. Whether this
will facilitate a program and a river basin management plan that will actual improve
water quality depends on cooperation in coming years.
With regard to success measured in terms of co-operation formation, one has
to conclude that the institutional sediment of cross border linkages is minimal.
Furthermore the topics dealt with and products reflect just the minimal requirements
as set by WFD. Actors explained that real integration appealed to them however
the short term obligations of WFD required all available resources. Under these
challenging circumstances the emphasis was more on securing national compliance
with ambitious obligations and less on cross border coordination that was seen as
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extra-special. In this setting international coordination was still considered an add-
on element to national trajectories of WFD implementation.
6.4 Policy Arrangements Framework
Although this case is strongly influenced by the obligatory character of the WFD
and water managers’ fear of incompliance, some questions emerge. For instance
why did actors not coordinate cross-border activities more timely and why were
national water management traditions dominant in cross border interaction? The
suspects in this article are singularities and differenced in elements of involved policy
arrangements. The findings can be summarized as follows.
6.4.1 Actors and Coalitions
The in- and exclusion of actors proved influential. The number of actors involved in
water management in Germany is larger and offers a less homogeneous landscape
with regard to composition, tasks, responsibilities and legal position compared to
the Dutch. Especially striking is the strong separation between actors involved in
water policy making and actors involved in implementation. It is clear that German
implementers hardly participated in the cross-border component of the activities.
Some think that policy making and especially a high level of ambition gets easy by
this, however it might boomerang back during implementation while implementers
might lack finances and might prove not supportive of the policy. The involved
Dutch actors are responsible for both policy making and implementation. Awareness
of involved implementation costs and stakeholders, for instance farmers, to be
encountered, led to a pragmatic approach.
6.4.2 Resources
For the described WFD activities limited financial resources were needed. Moni-
toring is not costly compared to the costs of taking pollution reduction measures.
For other WFD activities costs might be substantial and the allocation of involved
costs between upstream and downstream water managers might become an issue
in the future. In Lower Saxony and North Rhine Westphalia the emphasis was on
technical and expert knowledge. Exaggerated, this can be considered as an emphasis
on an ‘epistemic resource’, emphasizing knowledge, science and exhaustive analysis.
The Dutch reciprocity between, on the one hand, technical and expert resources
and political and societal support as a resource on the other hand, extends more
pragmatic and restrictive approaches to the knowledge domain.
6.4.3 Rules of the Game
The German administrative culture tends to be rather hierarchical, formal and
legislative in comparison to the Dutch administrative culture. The German policy
culture also includes a strong position for professional expert views and exhaustive
analysis. Dutch political culture tends to be rather informal and horizontal. In water
management the hierarchy between central government and de-central governments
only exist in matters of ‘national importance’, and even then a consensual policy style
is preferred. With regard to policy priorities the German actors often experience the
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Dutch positions as not stable and too pluralist. This led to confusion with regard to
meetings and decisions. In some cases Germans perceived decisions to be taken while
Dutch partners perceived the issues involved as a trial and error process, a strategy
to bridge the pluralist landscape of technocrat and expert domains and political
domestic domains. Dutch actors do not understand why they have to pass German
superiors before they can confer with German colleagues.
6.4.4 Discourses
With regard to discourses related to water quality, there is an ongoing discourse on
the quality of waste water treatment between Dutch and German authorities; the
Dutch claim that German treatment infrastructure and plants function less effective.
On the other hand, there is an ongoing debate that implies that German agriculture
is less intensive and rinse off of German agricultural land is better regulated. So
this implies the suggestion, from the German point of view, that ‘if anyone has to
improve their performances and decrease their waste load, the Dutch agricultural
sector should do so’ and one should not require such from the Germans. However,
these discourses did not play a traceable role in the assessed WFD activities. This is
not surprising, since it is only the subsequent phase, that of programming measures,
that will upset and mobilize stakeholders.
Drawing conclusions from this case on the monitoring activities in the light of
an European Directive, a “cooperative attitude” could be found, but co-operation
activities were actually slow, fragmented and evolved only gradually despite gen-
erally resembling water policies in Germany and The Netherland, and despite the
‘shadow of Europe’. The cause of this is again sought in a differentiating between
policy formulation and policy implementation, but this time it is about the differences
in administrative style in Germany and The Netherlands: the Dutch combine—
policy formulation and implementation and can switch between them, while German
implementers are hardly involved in early phases of policy making. Similar remarks
were made on the rules of decision making and the differences in the position of
the expert. Discourses show several points of discussion on water quality, including
a more or less a concealed distrust in activities across the border.
7 The Dutch–German Working Group in the Rhine River Basin
The Working Group on high water in the river Rhine area is the final Dutch–
German case. The initiative to establish a Dutch–German Working Group came
from the Dutch province of Gelderland (in the Eastern part of the Netherlands)
in the mid-1990s. As one respondent put it, “The existing initiatives were too
bureaucratic, focused too much on water quality and did not pay much attention
to implementation. Besides, we felt that existing initiatives were at state-level and
regional co-operation was lacking.” (Verwijmeren and Wiering 2007 p. 96). The
province of Gelderland contacted the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia in
order to establish some form of co-operation in flooding politics in their border area.
Together with a regional office of Rijkswaterstaat, the Inspectorate-General of the
Transport and Water management, they became the lead participants in the Dutch–
German Working Group on high water.
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7.1 Problem Structure
The problems with flooding were felt most urgently when two flood events in the
Rhine area occured, one in 1993 and one in 1995. The 1995-event was most delicate in
the Rhine area, not because of a real disaster, but because of the threat of disaster that
created shock waves in Dutch society, as dikes were only just keeping the water from
crossing the top and there was serious danger of dike-bursts because of the quality of
dikes. About 250,000 people were evacuated in the Dutch part of the basin. After this
‘warning sign’ Dutch–German co-operation increased, also within the framework of
the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine. But, as was stated
above, the bilateral contacts on a national level and the formal consultations and
co-operation were not satisfactory; the regions felt the urge of closer co-operation
on the regional level. The flooding issue is both a classical assymetrical ‘upstream–
downstream’ problem but contains more symmetrical elements too, because flood
measures taking downstream can have a limited, but substantial impact upstream
or are of importance for the region as a whole. Moreover, protecting polders from
flooding and regulating the water household in the whole regional area are clearly
featured by cross border mutual interdependencies (Fig. 4).
7.2 Co-operation
The Working Group has mainly worked on joint research projects, e.g. on extreme
levels of high water in the upper Rhine area (Lammersen 2004), and cross border risk
Fig. 4 Map Rhine river basin
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analysis, but also takes effort in informing the (national and regional) public about
Dutch–German cross border water issues. It publishes a yearly bilingual magazine on
flooding issues and organizes a biennial conference. Until now the Working Group
has not worked on actual joint policy planning, policy- or project activities, although
there are closely related projects that deal with developing flood warning systems
(the VIKING project) and cross border inspections of flood defenses.
7.3 Extent of Co-operation
As far as co-operation formation and output is concerned, the Working Group can be
considered an example of successful cross border co-operation. Co-operation in the
Working Group is based on a ‘common declaration’, which constitutes the ‘formal
rules of the game’. This common declaration clearly states why the Working Group
was established, which results are expected and which activities are undertaken
to achieve these results (an operational programme). Within the boundaries of its
relatively modest objectives the Working Group has produced considerable output
during the last 10 years. The second criterion, co-operation effectiveness, is more
problematic. Although there are increasing cross border (flood) communications,
improvements in risk analysis and contributions to disaster management, it is impos-
sible to establish the ‘problem solving’-influence on the water system of the River
Rhine. In regard to stakeholder satisfaction, without exception respondents shared
the conclusion that the Working Group is a successful example of cross border co-
operation (Verwijmeren and Wiering 2007, p. 97).
7.4 Policy Arrangements Framework
7.4.1 Actors and Coalitions
As regards the actors’ dimension, the policy arrangements in the Netherlands and
North Rhine-Westphalia are strikingly similar. In both countries (almost) all actors
are government organisations with an interest in flood protection. The division of
tasks and resources between these actors is also similar. At both sides actors are
included that are involved in policy formulation, that are responsible for policy
implementation and that provide for knowledge of the water system. These similar-
ities make it easy for actors to find a cross-border counterpart with whom they can
identify. Moreover, it appears important that all actors have a regional background.
According to several respondents, regional (policy) actors have a greater sense of
urgency of problems in the area and more local knowledge than national state actors.
Second, the Working Group consists of civil servants and researchers; politicians are
not closely involved. Some respondents feel that they would have been excessively
pressured into getting results if politicians were involved.
7.4.2 Resources
From the perspective of the interests of North Rhine-Westphalia (as the upstream
country) co-operation with the Dutch is not very obvious, although flood measures
taken in The Netherlands may affect part of the water system in Germany. But co-
operation makes more sense if we look at the available resources. The availability of
Dutch knowledge especially, might improve the position of North Rhine-Westphalia
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vis-à-vis other German states. Working on water safety on a project basis (EU-
projects mostly) is attractive to regional partners in water management and envi-
ronmental policy.
7.4.3 Rules of the Game
Looking at the rules of the game, the picture is mixed. At the ‘micro’ level of
the Working Group itself, the preference for discussing technical issues makes co-
operation easier. “It is more likely that agreement is reached about technical issues
than about issues concerning day-to-day policies,” to quote one respondent. On the
other hand, on the ‘macro’ level, existing legal differences between the German
and Dutch policy arrangements complicate matters. Respondents especially point
out the differences in procedures in spatial planning-legislation and at the fact that
expropriation is much more difficult in Germany than in the Netherlands. These
differences might obstruct the shift towards joint policy and implementation projects
(as in the Dinkel case).
7.4.4 Discourses
In the discourse dimension, finally, two aspects stand out. First, the substantial water
policy discourse of The Netherlands and NRW is similar: to create more space for
the rivers. Next to this substantial flood management discourse, there is another
discursive element: a story line of transboundary co-operation, which is apparent
in North Rhine Westphalia. North Rhine-Westphalia is itself largely dependent on
measures taken in upstream German states. As a result, it is greatly in the interest of
North Rhine-Westphalia to stress the storyline (or discourse) of ‘solidarity between
people upstream and downstream’. The consequence of stressing this storyline is that
co-operation with actors in the area downstream of North Rhine-Westphalia, i.e.
actors in the Netherlands, also becomes important and in a sense even inevitable.
Finally, it is important to stress the wider environment in which the Working
Group developed. As many respondents stress, the Working Group did not have
to start from scratch. They point particularly at the experiences with cross border co-
operation within the International Commission for Protection of the Rhine (ICPR).
And they expect that the future European Flooding Directive might be an additional
incentive for cross border co-operation.
In conclusion, the Dutch and German policy arrangements are fairly similar and
the urgency of the flooding problem is felt in both countries. There is access to
resources (especially in the Netherlands) and the parties involved are mainly regional
and operate on similar levels. Both countries also feel they can benefit from the
exchange of knowledge and they (feel that they) are mutually dependent for a
solution of the problem.
8 Case Comparison
One of the aims of this article was to illustrate the discrepancy between the (Euro-
pean) ideal of transboundary river basin management and the harsh realities of actual
cross border co-operation in regional settings. To explain cross border co-operation,
the conditions that lead to co-operation formation, co-operation effectiveness and
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stakeholder satisfaction were identified with the help of a short overview of liter-
ature and an analytical framework to compare three cases at the Dutch–German
border. The most important findings from the PAA-analysis are summarised in
Table 1.
Table 1 Supportive and non-supportive factors for cross-border co-operation
Dimensions\cases Dinkel, river restoration Vecht, EU-water Rhine, flooding
Framework directive
General cross NL: low NL: high NL: high
border D: low D: moderate D: moderate
dependencies − + +
Actors and Similar cross border Similar cross border Similar cross border
coalitions counterparts; regional counterparts, but counterparts, regional
policy field; administrative differences in policy representatives,
organisations ‘fit’ or administrative but with national
styles: in D separation ‘mandates’, focus on
between policy technical exchange
formulation and
implementation is
strong, while in the
NL it is weak
++ − +
Resources Interchange of knowledge Interchange of Interchange of
resources knowledge resources knowledge resources
Sufficient budgets Sufficient budgets Sufficient budgets
+ + +
Rules of the game Project rules clearly Germany: hierarchy; Small but clear
structured formalisations; NL: mandate; Differences
informal, pragmatic in spatial policies
In planning, no obstacles, might become
but in implementation, yes problem in the future
+/− − +
Discourses Similar/room for the river Different ideas on Similar/room for the
& ecology sources of pollution, river − discourse +
sometimes blaming solidarity − discourse
each other of co-operation
++ _ ++
National policies No urgency Gradually stimulating Sense of urgency,
stimulating? through EU stimulating cross
implementation border flood policies
− + +
Other contextual Basic idea of river basin WFD procedural Builds upon
features? & approach and goals later context experiences in Rhine
became integral part of the co-operation
WFD as of 2000
+ + +
General picture Succesful in planning stage, Moderately succesful Succesful in output,
of cross border but not succesful in effectivity and
co-operation implementation stage stakeholder
satisfaction; limited
ambitions
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What are the differences and similarities in these three cases at the Dutch–
German border? As was explained in Section 4, the cases are similar in regard to
the general water policies and cultural features of Germany and The Netherlands.
Moreover, all cases have an upstream–downstream problem structure, although this
can work out differently in the cases. In the Dinkel Planning-case co-operation was
only partially a success: although the planning was successful and promising, it got
stuck in the phase of policy implementation. There was co-operation formation and
output, but no adoption of policies, thus co-operation effectiveness was limited to
making a plan, and results were not satisfactory for stakeholders in the end. In the
case of the Vecht (Water Framework Directive) the co-operation formation was very
limited with regard to ‘institutional sediments’, but co-operation can be considered
effective within the bounds of the step-by-step procedural process of the WFD.
The involved stakeholders were satisfied with the results, although processes were
delayed. In the case of the Dutch–German Working Group on High Water) in terms
of formation (considerable output, continuing co-operation), effectiveness (using
this output to influence policy processes) and with a high degree of stakeholders’
satisfaction, the co-operation can be considered successful.
Although none of these cases where categorized as ‘failures’ and all were at least
partly satisfying, the results of the Dinkel planning were disappointing compared to
the other two. The characteristics of the cases are summarised in Table 1 and valued
variables positive (+ = supportive or encouraging) or negative (− = non-supportive
or discouraging) for cross border co-operation. Why the Dinkel planning was not
brought any further (at that stage), can be related to a low urgency for national
authorities and low interdependencies that came with the topic of regional river
restoration. But, as already was stated, the initiative had no explicit ambitions to
actually implement the planning. Would the Dinkel Planning have been directed at
actual implementation, it would probably have been arranged otherwise or, another
round of decision making had become necessary; e.g. it would have been necessary
to make stronger links to formal decision making procedures in Germany and The
Netherlands (‘rules’), the arrangement would have included relevant politicians and
policy fields in an earlier stage (‘actors and resources’) and it would have been
important to convince them of the value of transboundary planning (transboundary
‘discourse’). The planning would have been more concerned with realizing river
restoration in a (difficult) agricultural setting, with the problem of expropriation
measures, with special planning consequences, etc. Other features of the Dinkel case
though, such as the domestic river management discourses and the availibility of
resources where not considered real obstacles for further implementation.
Given the Dutch–German relationships (‘relatively integrated’), the obligatory
nature of the WFD procedures and—on top of that—the integrated river basin
approach of the WFD, one can wonder why in the Vecht case co-operation was
lingering? This is explained by another feature of policy arrangements and that
is the domestic policy organization and policy style. There is strong separation
between policy formulation and policy implementation in Germany (i.e. North
Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony), while Dutch policy actors are involved in
both and pragmatically switch between the two.
In the Rhine case we found strong similarities in the issue of flooding management
and in the way the cross border initiative was designed: an attuned constellation
of actors, a similar division of tasks between them, a similar discourse on flooding
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management and, perhaps most important of all, a ‘solidarity’ discourse towards co-
operation.
9 Conclusions and Discussion
This article adressed questions regarding the barriers and obstacles, but also the
incentives of regional cross border co-operation. Our analysis on the Dutch–German
border puts forward that, within relatively similar politico-cultural landscapes, co-
operation still can differ along the policy issue at hand and the urgency and interests
that come along with characteristics of these issues. The regional policy arrangements
regarding flooding issues in the Rhine river basin showed strong similarities across
the border, but in water quality management the existing differences in institutional
structures in Germany and The Netherlands also delayed co-operation. For river
restoration was concluded that it suffered from a lack of urgency of co-operation and
the project was not tailored to the implementation phase.
When comparing the findings of the literature review with our case studies, the
following conditions of, or factors that support, cross borders co-operation, can be
distinguished (for a more detailed overview see Verwijmeren and Wiering 2007,
170–171).
Actors:
– Small number of actors
– Actors with similar mindsets
– Actors with similar responsibilities (regional management)
– Involvement of all relevant stakeholders from the beginning
Resources:
– Availability of sufficient financial resources
– Availability of sufficient knowledge
– Willingness to redistribute resources or to achieve issue linkage
Rules of the game:
– Sufficient mandate to make joint policies
– Commitments that are binding, clear, transparant and feasible
– Comparable rules of the game in all countries involved
– Supra-national (European) legislative framework(s)
Discourse:
– Existence of a feeling of urgency
– Existence of a feeling of solidarity
– Focus on issues that are not polically sensitive
– Comparable discourse in all countries involved
Some of the (many) factors of the literature overview can now be highlighted and
some are not yet mentioned in previous literature. First, ‘problem structure’ and
related interdependencies still are crucial for a long term impact of co-operation;
there must be a (lingering) ‘sense of urgency’ of co-operation, in order to get policy
plans processed in measures on both sides of the border. Second, both substantial
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discourses (e.g. room for the river) and co-operation discourses are important to
reach succesfull initiatives. Discourses can change the sense of urgency and the
felt interdependencies. Especially in the Rhine river basin the solidarity discourse
of the upstream with the downstream country can not easily be overestimated.
Finally, we want to put emphasis on the policy cycle in two different ways. The
Vecht-case on the WFD pointed at differences in the administrative styles between
countries. In this case was concluded that the Dutch combine policy formulation
and policy implementation pragmatically, while in Germany these phases are stricly
separated. This also relates to differences in the role of experts and expertise. In
the Dinkel planning another aspect of the policy cycle was relevant: the planning
process was succesful, but the implementation was not. The Dinkel case proved
that making transboundary plans is perfectly possible, but implementing them causes
many difficulties and asks for new rounds of policy making, with at least new actors,
new resources and new rules. New rounds of decision making in the direction of
implementing measures on both sides of the border (usually with high expectations
of integration) will be also be confronted with a new set of conditions for succesfull
co-ooperation.
Our findings on the policy cycle and the difficulties of co-operation in actual
implementation suggest the idea of an ‘invisible wall’ between cross border planning
and cross border implementation. In fact, the cases that were modest, with low but
clear ambitions of integration, were most successful. This, in fact, sets limits to the
ambitions of cross border co-operation. The higher the initiatives’ ambition and the
further down the difficult road of cross border implementation, the more integrated
policy arrangements will have to become and the more complex cross border co-
operation is.
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